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Protecting American Soldiers: The 
Development, Testing, and Fielding of 
the Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)
Robert F. Mortlock, Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, 
Monterey, California, USA
Current Situation, Summer 2013
Monday Morning Project Management Office 
Staff Meeting:
Chief Engineer, Project Office: “Sir, we have an Enhanced 
Combat Helmet (ECH) update. We just learned that Direc-
tor, Operational Test & Evaluation sent Congress the ECH 
“Beyond Low Rate Initial Production Report,” and recom-
mended that the Army not buy or field the helmet. The report 
says the unit cost is too high and that soldiers wearing the 
ECH would have an unacceptably high risk of dying from 
excessive backface transient deformation from threat bullets.”
Project Manager:1 “Hmmm . . . that puts us right in the 
middle between the warfighters and the operational tes-
ters. Both Army senior leaders and Congress rely on the 
independent assessment of operational testers for good 
reasons. They have a lot of influence.”
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. Also, the testers received concur-
rence from the Army Surgeon General with their assess-
ments and recommendations.”
Project Manager: “So, after a four-year joint development 
and testing effort with the Marine Corps in which the 
ECH finally passed its requirements, now we have to get 
an Army decision on whether to buy and field the helmet 
against the recommendations of the testing and medical 
communities, who have legitimate safety concerns?”
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. The warfighters and Army com-
bat developers have been very involved in this effort, and 
they remain adamant that the ECH should be fielded to 
deploying soldiers. The requirement remains over 35,000 
helmets. The Marine Corps is strongly in favor of buying 
and fielding the helmet as well.”
Project Manager: “What’s the funding situation?”
Chief Engineer: “We have over US$35 million in operations 
and maintenance funding reserved for the buy that must be 
obligated by the end of the September or the Army will lose 
the funding.”
Project Manager: “Okay. Well, you know the drill. The 
operational testers probably already have the ear of the 
boss—the Army Acquisition Executive, who is the deci-
sion authority because the ECH was a wartime directed 
requirement with high visibility. Let’s get together a solid 
briefing to review, and let’s start scheduling the pre-briefs. 
Also, we need to be prepared to provide the congressional 
committees an update with the Army’s decision. There are 
many stakeholders involved with the ECH, and some will 
not be happy. So, we need to think about how this will play 
out with the media and senior leaders from all the stake-
holders with a solid strategic communications plan.”
Background
The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top 
priority for senior leaders in the U.S. Army, Defense Depart-
ment, and Congress. The Defense Department committed 
considerable resources and funding over the years in research 
and development, resulting in advanced materials and man-
ufacturing processes. These investments paid off. American 
soldiers went into battle with technologically advanced, 
rigorously tested combat equipment. Soldiers knew that 
their combat equipment worked as intended. In the end, that 
increased the combat effectiveness of the soldiers and their 
units. The force protection of soldiers was considered as a 
layered approach. The outer force protection layer for sol-
diers was situational awareness. The middle force protection 
layer was concealment. The inner force protection layer was 
personal protective equipment, like helmets, eyewear, and 
ballistic vests with ceramic plate inserts. Specifically, combat 
helmets provided soldiers skull and brain protection against 
both ballistic threats (e.g., bullets) and blunt impact forces, 
and prevented mild traumatic brain injury and concussions.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army col-
lected battle-damaged helmets to better understand the 
threat and capabilities of the helmets. The battle-damaged 
helmets were often later returned to soldiers in ceremonies 
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1Within the U.S. Defense Acquisition, a project manager (usually a U.S. Army officer in 
the rank of colonel) reports to a politically appointed civilian called the Army Acquisition 
Executive—the ultimate program decision authority. The Director, Operational Test & 
Evaluation (DOT&E) is an independent, politically appointed, senior executive charged 
with overseeing operational live fire testing and reporting directly to the Secretary of 
Defense and Congress on program testing.
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as shown and described in Figure 1. In many situations, the 
helmets saved the soldier lives, and these ceremonies under-
scored the importance of soldier protective equipment for 
combat effectiveness and soldier force protection.
Despite an emphasis on improving force protection, efforts 
to modernize helmets faced the challenges that all programs 
within the Department of Defense faced: a complex, bureau-
cratic Defense Acquisition institution.2 The accelerated pace 
of technology innovation, rapidly evolving threats, and declin-
ing defense budgets made program management within the 
DoD challenging but even more critical than ever. Defense 
Acquisition operated in an uncertain, complex, and ambigu-
ous environment, but maintained a simple focus: develop, 
procure, and field advanced warfighting capability to soldiers 
to enable technological superiority on the modern battlefield.
Army Combat Helmet Evolution
Army combat helmets evolved over time as the Army traded-
off increased performance and cost (see Figure 2). The com-
bat helmets that soldiers wore into battle showed a constant 
improvement in performance and increase in cost over time. 
Improvement in performance resulted from advances in 
material research and manufacturing techniques. Soldiers 
wore the M1 helmet, nicknamed the “steel pot,” from the 
1940s through the late 1970s. The M1 provided ballistic pro-
tection largely because steel is hard. The M1 helmet consisted 
of a pressed manganese steel shell with a webbing suspension 
that soldiers fitted to their heads. Despite being an improve-
ment over previous helmets, the M1 helmet was heavy and 
uncomfortable, and it provided little blunt trauma protection.
Advances in material research provided the opportunity 
to increase ballistic protection at a reduced weight. The 
maturation of ballistic fabrics based on para-aramid polymer 
technology enabled the Army to replace the M1 with the Per-
sonnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) helmet in 
the mid-1980s. These helmets were in the three to four pound 
range (lighter than the M1) and provided increased ballistic 
protection. The shell of the helmet consisted of layers of bal-
listic aramid fabric, the most famous of which is DuPont’s 
Kevlar®—resulting in the “Kevlar” or “K-pot” nicknames. 
The ballistic aramid technology allowed helmets to provide 
not only fragmentation protection from explosions but also 
small caliber hand gun protection at a reasonable weight. 
Eventually, the Modular Integrated Communication Helmet 
replaced the PASGT helmet on a limited basis. By the mid-
2000s, the Advanced Combat Helmet was the Army’s primary 
helmet. The basis for all combat helmets after the M1 “steel 
pot” and prior to 2008 was para-aramid polymer technology. 
These helmets provided soldiers important performance 
improvements like increased ballistic protection, reduced 
weight, and better blunt impact protection by replacing web-
bing suspension systems with padding systems between the 
helmet shell and the wearer’s head.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. Army Research 
Lab, the U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering 
Command, and commercial industry teamed to mature the 
next generation of ballistics materials, resulting in the develop-
ment of high-molecular-weight polyethylene ballistics fibers 
that could be weaved into fabrics with application to combat 
helmets. Polyethylene polymer materials had different perfor-
mance characteristics than para-aramid polymer materials. 
Above certain temperatures, para- aramids (classified as ther-
mosets) polymers broke down, lost their properties, and could 
Figure 1: Why were stakeholders so passionate about helmets? The photo on the right was a photo taken by the Army of a battle-
damaged helmet returned to a soldier in a ceremony at Fort Belvoir in 2016. In news coverage entitled “U.S. Army soldier reunited with 
equipment that saved his life in Afghanistan,” the reporter covered the soldier’s description of how his helmet saved his life. The photo 
on the left was another photo taken of a recovered helmet damaged by enemy fire in Afghanistan.
2Refer to Figure 4 and Appendix 1 for a description of the U.S. Defense Department 
Acquisition institution.
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not be remolded back into their original states when cooled. 
On the other hand, above certain temperatures, polyethylene 
polymers (classified as thermoplastics) broke down but could 
be remolded into their original state when cooled. The appli-
cation of high-molecular-weight polyethylene fiber material 
in helmets created the misperception that helmets might 
easily lose their form under ballistic events and potentially 
jeopardize soldiers’ safety. Ultimately, the advantages of 
polyethylene helmets for reduced weight and greater ballistic 
capability outweighed this concern. The basis of future Army 
helmets—both the ECH and its eventual replacement, the 
Soldier Protection System future combat helmet—remained 
high-molecular-weight polyethylene technology.
Helmet Testing Basics3
The Army rigorously tested combat helmets worn by sol-
diers against protocols to ensure they conform to stringent 
requirements to protect soldiers against both blunt trauma 
and ballistic threats. Three ballistic properties remained 
particularly important for describing impacts to helmets: 
complete penetration (the bullets goes completely through 
the helmet), partial penetration (the bullet does not go 
completely through the helmet), and backface deformation 
(a measure for the amount the round’s impact indents the 
helmet material).
The final performance of the helmet in testing and in 
combat depended both on the inherent properties of the 
materials used to develop the helmet and the processing 
techniques used to manufacture the helmet. Helmet require-
ments used performance-based requirements. Each helmet 
manufacturer optimized its design over time using a com-
bination of materials (layers of polymer fibers woven into 
sheets with chemical binders) and different processes based 
on temperature, pressure, and time. The use of statistics was 
important in testing because testing simulates live com-
bat, and the warfighter required a high confidence that the 
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Figure 2: The evolution of combat helmets.
3Appendix 2 presents a tutorial on helmet testing.
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helmets performed as advertised. The testing balanced the 
need for statistical confidence with the costly and destructive 
nature of the testing.
Operational Field Data
As was presented previously, the Army collected battle-
damaged helmets from soldiers. Before returning them, the 
Army conducted forensic studies to better understand enemy 
threats and analyzed the performance of the helmets to 
improve future designs. From combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Army collected 77 helmets hit by small arms 
bullets. When the bullet completely penetrated the helmet, 
the soldiers died nearly 75% of the time. When the bullets did 
not completely penetrate the helmet (partial penetration), 
the average permanent helmet deformation was about 9 mm 
and the soldiers all survived with relatively minor head/neck 
injuries and eventually returned to duty.
Part One: Project Initiation Decision,  
Early 2009 Timeframe
Colonel Bob Smith4 was recently assigned as the Project Man-
ager, Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment—the office 
responsible for developing, testing, procuring, and fielding 
helmets to soldiers. Colonel Smith was a seasoned defense 
acquisition veteran with over 15 years of project management 
experience. During his preparation for this position, the guid-
ance from the warfighting community and senior leaders was 
clear: the top priorities were maximum protection and weight 
reduction.
Colonel Smith was preparing for a key decision in the Pen-
tagon regarding the start of a new helmet program, named the 
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH). Luckily, Colonel Smith’s 
chief engineer for the program office was an armor expert, 
Dr. James Suchez. Dr. Suchez led the efforts to mature high-












































• 77 Helmets collected:
– All resulting from Small Arms Fire
– 31 engagements resulted in wounded-in-action soldiers
– 45 engagements resulted in killed-in-action soldiers
• Analysis: 
– If a helmet stopped the bullets, the soldier had a very high 
probability for survival
– 0% fatality rate for partial penetrations
– For partial penetrations, no serious behind helmet blunt trauma 
reported and no serious neck injuries reported
– 73.7% fatality rate for complete penetrations






Partial Penetration 16 16 0 0%
Complete Penetration 61 15 45 73.7%
Recovered Bale Damaged Helmet Data
Average helmet deformation 
depth =  9.02 mmHelmet 
Deformaon
Figure 3: Recovered battle damaged helmet data.
4The names in this case are fictitious.
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and with commercial industry for the last decade. Dr. Suchez 
explained that the application of these new novel polymers 
to helmets allowed the Army to consider the following basic 
options for the new helmet requirements: (1) maintain the 
protection levels of the current helmets with a reduced weight 
of up to 20%, or (2) increase the protection levels but maintain 
(or increase) the weight of the helmet.
Colonel Smith knew that the Army’s senior leaders would 
rely on the advice and recommendations of the project man-
ager during the meeting. The final decision would be made 
by the Army Acquisition Executive, the Honorable (Hon) 
Ron Cho. The Hon Cho would likely turn to key stakeholders 
before making the final decision.
The first stakeholder was the project manager, and Colo-
nel Smith thought that he was well prepared to discuss key 
considerations from a cost, schedule, performance, and tech-
nology perspective. The second stakeholder was the warf-
ighter representative, also called the “user” representative. 
The warfighter representative was a crusty old officer named 
Colonel Billy Johnson from Fort Benning, home of the U.S. 
Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Colonel Johnson spent 
most of his time in the Army leading soldiers in combat. Colo-
nel Johnson took his job seriously as the ultimate approver of 
the requirements. He was passionate about the possibility for 
a new helmet because he believed that the current helmets 
were too heavy and uncomfortable. He also represented the 
warfighters currently downrange in combat, and was under 
extreme pressure to approve requirements for a new helmet 
to protect soldiers not only against fragmentation and hand-
gun rounds, but also against enemy rifle threats. Another key 
stakeholder was Colonel Harry Crisp, the representative from 
the testing community—specifically from the Director, Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation. Any new helmet development 
program fell under operational testing oversight to approve 
the testing protocols used to ensure the requirements were 
met. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation also provided 
an independent assessment of the helmet’s operational effec-
tiveness and suitability for soldiers to Army senior leaders 
and documented that assessment in reports to Congress. 
Colonel Harry Crisp had years of experience as a tester and 
evaluator of Army systems. The importance, influence, and 
visibility of operational tester’s independent assessment were 
increased by the recent congressional and public concerns 
calling into question the adequacy of soldiers’ protective 
equipment.
Colonel Smith knew that each of the stakeholders was 
passionate about a new helmet program. He realized that 
his role as the project manager was not to advocate for a 
new program but to give advice about the underpinning 
technological possibilities; additionally, he needed to lay out 
the cost, schedule, and performance implications of various 
strategies for the development, testing, and procurement of 
the new helmet.
Two important determinants of program success were 
requirements definition and alignment of those requirements 
against capability gaps. Simply put, poorly defined require-
ments set a project’s initial trajectory that would be difficult to 
fix later in the development cycle. Project initiation was some-
times the result of a need from the warfighters generically 
called capability pull. Alternatively, a project resulted from 
an innovative new technology without a specific identified 
warfighting application generically called technology push. 
The question of technology push or capability pull at program 
initiation often delayed efforts and created perception chal-
lenges among key stakeholders. The ECH effort was driven 
by the urgent need for a new helmet to address protection for 
soldiers against rifle threats in combat, and enabled by the 
maturation of high-molecular-weight polyethylene technolo-
gies. The helmet requirements had to balance acceptable min-
imum risk versus maximum safety for protective equipment, 
and weight reduction (soldier load) versus protection (bal-
listic and blunt force). Colonel Smith knew that this balance 
would not be an easy compromise for any of the stakeholders.
During the meeting hosted by the Hon Cho, Colonel 
Johnson was adamant that the ECH had to address the 
rifle threat, be fielded as quickly as possible, and reduce 
the weight on soldiers in combat. Colonel Smith laid out 
the basic options that he had discussed with Dr. Suchez; the 
ECH would not be able the address the rifle threat and also 
reduce the helmet weight. Colonel Johnson was not happy, 
and doubted the validity of the technology assessment. He 
stated that, just a week prior, he received an industry brief 
from a company that claimed they could develop a helmet 
at reduced weights that also addressed increased threats. 
Dr. Suchez, also in attendance, spoke up and said that it was 
not unusual for industry to make claims that they could not 
back up, and that the application of a new technology into 
helmets is technically challenging from a manufacturing 
perspective. “It’s one thing to produce a prototype helmet in 
a controlled laboratory,” he said, “but completely different to 
produce many helmets from a manufacturing line that consis-
tently perform against rigorous testing requirements.”
To address the schedule aspect of the program, Colonel 
Smith next laid out the options of pursuing a formal program 
of record through the deliberate acquisition process versus 
pursuing a rapid acquisition process supported by a directed 
or urgent requirement. Establishing a formal ECH program 
involved a four-year time period of contracting, development, 
and testing. Year one allowed for the refinement, analysis, 
and approval of formal requirement documents and the 
development of testing protocols. Year one also allowed for 
the Army to request development and procurement funding 
from Congress in the Army’s base budget for the program. 
Years two and three involved the development and testing 
of helmet prototypes resulting from competitively awarded 
contracts (cost-plus type contracts) to be awarded to industry 
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companies. Year four allowed for the Army to award procure-
ment contracts to the successful companies for the manufac-
ture and production of helmets. Again, Colonel Johnson was 
not happy that it would take four years to get the new helmet 
to soldiers. The alternative to a program of record was to use 
the rapid acquisition process. In rapid acquisition, the Army 
wrote a directed requirement (within a month) for the ECH, 
and the Army awarded competitive contracts (fixed-price 
contracts for certain quantities with production options) to 
industry within six months. A rapid acquisition effort could 
be funded with money from overseas contingency operations 
accounts (separate from the Army’s base budget approved by 
Congress), which was limited to procurement money and no 
development money. Another six months would be required 
to test the helmets. So, ECHs could be on soldiers in just over 
a year. Colonel Johnson was much happier with the second 
strategy. Colonel Crisp was quick to point out that for the 
rapid acquisition options, the new helmet’s requirements 
would not be underpinned by analysis, and the test protocols 
had to rely on the protocols for current helmets because there 
would be no time to develop test protocols specifically for the 
ECH. Colonel Crisp noted this was particularly important for 
the ECH, which would rely on thermoplastic polymers. A hel-
met based on polyethylenes might perform much differently 
than the current para-aramid based helmets. For example, 
ECHs had the potential to lose their rigidity after being shot 
once and offered much less protection from multiple shots. 
Also, the ECH may deform excessively, leading to head 
trauma and skull fractures. There were legitimate testing and 
safety concerns that would have to be addressed.
Colonel Smith tried to remain neutral. Both strategies had 
advantages and disadvantages. Decision making involved 
defining and analyzing alternative approaches and came 
down to the level of risk the Army was willing to accept. The 
ECH project initiation decision also encompassed setting 
future funding levels and procurement quantities, as well as 
addressing industrial base concerns, competition, and testing 
implications. From past experience, Colonel Smith under-
stood that stakeholder management was key to the success of 
the ECH program and that proper communication and col-
laboration increased the chances of program success.
The Hon Cho was pleased with the frank dialog between 
the key stakeholders and stated that enough information 
was presented for an informed decision on whether or not 
to initiate the ECH program. Before prioritizing resources 
for the ECH program, the ECH had to be considered through 
the lens of the Defense Acquisition institutional framework 
(see Figure 4). The project manager had cost, schedule, and 
performance responsibilities, and managed the effort with 
the Defense Acquisition Management System. The project 
manager’s official chain of command was in the executive 
branch, but the project manager also reported to Congress 
with program status updates and worked through contracts 
with industry. The requirements generation system provided 
requirements and the resource allocation system provided 
funding. Depending on the program, the public and media 
perceptions became important considerations.
The warfighters in combat wanted a new lighter helmet 
that also protected soldiers against rifle bullets—soldiers 
were dying in combat. Colonel Smith knew that the Hon Cho 
wanted a follow-up meeting with him before deciding what 
the Army should do. He gathered his thoughts and wrote 
down what he thought were the key questions he had to 
consider:
• Who are the key stakeholders in the ECH program initiation 
decision and how does he manage their expectations?
• Would the ECH program be considered a “technology push” 
or “capability pull” program, and what are the implications?
• How should the ECH requirements be set? Should increased 
protection or weight reduction be emphasized?
• What is the right balance between reductions of soldier load 
(combat weight) versus greater soldier protection?
• How does the Army set testing protocols for the ECH prior to 
development and manufacturing of a helmet based on a new 
technology?
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of various acqui-
sition approaches for the development, testing, procurement, 
and fielding of the ECH? What are the criteria used to com-
pare the alternative approaches?
The ECH Program
The ECH program began in early 2009 (as shown in Figure 5). 
The Army and the U.S. Marine Corps approved urgent 
requirements based on combat operations and the need for 
increased protection against enemy rifle threats. The overseas 
contingency operations account funded the ECH program. 
The acquisition procurement objectives were set based on 
the predicted numbers of deploying soldiers. The Army set 
broad requirements to include a 35% increase in fragmen-
tation protection, increased 9-mm pistol protection, and 
rifle threat protection—all at the same weight of the current 
Advanced Combat Helmet. The acquisition strategy was a 
single step development in which competition was encour-
aged among industry manufacturers. The original request for 
proposal asked for each vendor to deliver test data validat-
ing their claim that their design met the combat helmet test 
protocols used at the time and the new ECH requirements for 
rifle protection. Four vendors submitted proposals; however, 
only one vender’s design was acceptable. At the end of 2009, 
this vendor received a contract to produce ECHs to undergo 
government developmental testing with contract options for 
production deliveries after successful first article tests. In 
late 2010, after successful developmental testing, the Army 
approved the program milestone to enter into low rate initial 
production with the selected vendor. The decision permitted 
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the production of a small number of helmets to undergo 
testing in order to validate that the contractor could success-
fully produce the helmets to performance requirements.
In late 2011, the ECH passed the second round of first arti-
cle testing. To meet an aggressive production schedule for the 
Army, the vendor submitted an engineering change proposal 
for second and third production lines. It took all of 2012 for 
the vendor to successfully pass the third round of first article 
testing for all three production lines after working through 
issues between test sites, the U.S. Army Test Center, and the 
National Institute Justice laboratories, as well as issues with 
the source of testing rifle rounds (Winchester versus Hornady 
versus Remington).
The testing results demonstrated that the ECH met its 
requirements and offered soldiers the potential for greater 
protection compared to the current helmet. Against a require-
ment for a 35% increase in fragmentation protection, the 
ECH demonstrated an average increase of 53%. For the 9-mm 
pistol deformation requirements, the ECH demonstrated 
an average increase in performance of 10% over the current 
helmet. Finally, against the chosen test rifle threat, the ECH 
demonstrated an over 153% increase in protection for resis-
tance to penetration; of note, was the fact that there was no 
backface deformation requirement against rifle threats for the 
ECH. The current helmet 9-mm pistol backface deformation 





Figure 4: U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution.
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was no basis to assign these requirements to rifle threats 
without injury data, which did not exist. To avoid jeopardizing 
the program due to unachievable or unrealistic requirements, 
rifle backface deformation testing occurred for government 
reference purposes only.
Part Two: ECH Procurement and Fielding 
Decision, Summer of 2013
After passing testing and four years since program initiation, 
in the summer of 2013, the ECH was ready for a full rate pro-
duction decision. Subsequently, the ECH would be produced 
as quickly as possible to the approved acquisition objective 
quantity. Each production lot of helmets would undergo lot 
acceptance testing to verify continued compliance to speci-
fication requirements. Finally, after passing lot acceptance 
testing, the Army could field helmets to soldiers deploying 
into combat.
The full rate production decision involved significant pro-
curement money (US$35 million) to buy and field the ECH. 
Despite testing results in which the ECH demonstrated supe-
rior performance against the requirements over current hel-
mets, Army leaders, specifically the Hon Cho and Colonel 
Smith, faced a difficult decision. Not all key stakeholders 
interpreted the test results similarly, raising significant con-
cerns about the safety of soldiers who might wear the ECH in 
combat. The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation issued a 
congressionally mandated “Beyond Low Rate Initial Produc-
tion Report” recommending that the ECH not be fielded to 
soldiers. The operational testers believed that the cost per 
helmet (roughly 2.5 times the current helmet) did not justify 
the minimal performance increase, and were also concerned 
that the Army did not test the ECH against the most stressing 
or most prevalent enemy rifle threats. Additionally, and more 
importantly, the testers stated that soldiers wearing the ECH in 
Figure 5: ECH program timeline.
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combat would face an unacceptable risk of head injuries due 
to excessive backface deformation caused by rifle rounds. The 
medical community, through the Army Surgeon General, sup-
ported the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation conclusions 
that ECH would put soldiers in unacceptable risk of head inju-
ries. These concerns put the Hon Cho and Colonel Smith in a 
difficult position. To further complicate matters, the Hon Cho 
had just spoken to the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 
who emphatically stood behind their recommendation.
Again, the Hon Cho convened the same Council of Colo-
nels that met four years earlier to discuss the decision to 
initiate the ECH program. Colonel Smith admitted the ECH 
program had not met the original timelines, but emphasized 
that the helmet had finally successfully passed testing and met 
its performance requirements. Colonel Smith also stressed 
that US$35 million was at risk if the procurement decision 
passed the end of the fiscal year, which was nearing. Colonel 
Crisp noted that he understood the program history well and 
understood the challenges. He reiterated that, in operational 
testers’ opinion, the ECH was not operationally effective or 
operationally suitable for fielding to soldiers. The risk of injury 
to soldiers was unacceptable; in the testers’ and the Army 
Surgeon General’s opinions, soldiers wearing the ECH could 
suffer life-threatening skull fractures from excessive backface 
deformation from threat rifle rounds. Additionally, Colonel 
Crisp noted that the ECH was not tested against the most 
stressing threats, bringing into question the validity of the 
requirements. Colonel Johnson was livid that there was even a 
question about the requirements. The entire community and 
all stakeholders had agreed to the original requirements more 
than four years earlier. Everyone had accepted the program 
risks. Now, three years later than planned, when the ECH 
finally passed testing, concerns were raised. Colonel Johnson 
stated that the warfighter community strongly recommended 
getting the ECH to soldiers as quickly as possible.
Colonel Smith again tried to remain neutral to avoid 
the appearance that the project manager was biased toward 
buying the ECH. He was compelled to provide the complete 
picture to the Hon Cho for the most informed decision. His 
program office was also charged with the collection and 
analysis of battle-damaged helmets from soldiers who had 
been shot in the head while wearing their helmets. Analysis of 
those helmets indicated that no soldiers had died or suffered 
major injuries as a result of excessive backface deformation 
of the helmet. The average deformation observed was 35% of 
the 9-mm pistol requirement of 25.4 mm (or coincidentally, 
exactly 1 inch). Colonel Crisp interrupted and stated that the 
operational testers placed no value on the results because they 
were not statistically robust, and were not done under strict 
testing conditions where the variables were controlled. Colo-
nel Crisp also pointed out that the government’s own reference 
testing indicated that the backface deformation observed from 
the test rifle threat was 18% to 89% higher than the 9-mm pistol 
requirement. Colonel Smith concurred with those numbers 
but indicated that he was not finished presenting the rest of the 
field data results, which indicated that nearly 74% of soldiers 
died if the threat round completely penetrated the helmet. 
Again, Colonel Crisp dismissed that data, and again brought 
up the rifle threat round used in testing. Colonel Johnson 
asked a question about the operational safety margin built 
into the testing. Colonel Smith replied in the affirmative that 
the chosen rifle round was fired at the ECH at muzzle velocity 
and at 0% obliquity, operationally providing soldiers a safety 
margin, because in combat, rounds are fired at considerable 
distance, slowing down in flight and striking at non-direct 
angles. Therefore, even though the chosen test round was not 
the most stressing rifle threat round, the ECH still provided 
considerable protection and 153% more protection from pen-
etration than the current helmet against the rifle threat.
The Hon Cho realized that the meeting of the Council 
of Colonels was probably at a point of agreeing to disagree. 
He understood each of the positions clearly and thanked 
everyone for their candid and articulate input. Colonel Smith 
understood well what that meant. Again, he had to recom-
mend a path forward for decision with the major stakehold-
ers not on the same page. Colonel Smith wrote the following 
questions that he knew he would have to address with Hon 
Cho before any decision was made:
• Who were the key stakeholders and how would he manage 
their expectations?
• How does the Army balance the importance of development 
test data versus field data from helmets that were battle dam-
aged? Should developmental test results or field data carry 
more weight in decision making? How can the same develop-
ment test data be interpreted differently by stakeholders?
• Are the concerns of the testing and medical communities 
warranted?
• How does the Army address these concerns with Congress, 
the media, and the American public?
• What are the advantages, disadvantages, and second order 
implications of various courses of actions for the path for-
ward? What are the decision criteria?
• How do you quantify benefits such as saving a soldier’s life 
and compare these benefits with long-term, potential health 
problems like concussions or musculoskeletal neck injuries 
from the weight of helmets?
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Appendix 1: U.S. Defense Acquisition 
Institution—Decision Framework
Within the U.S. Defense Department, the development, test-
ing, procurement, and fielding of capability for the warfighter 
operates within a decision-making framework that is com-
plex. Within the private sector, similar frameworks exist. The 
U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution has three fundamen-
tal support templates that provide requirements, funding, 
and management constraints. The Executive Branch, Con-
gress, and Industry work together to deliver capability with 
the program manager as the central person responsible 
for cost, schedule, and performance. Figure 6 depicts this 
framework.
The government project manager is at the center of 
Defense Acquisition, which aims to deliver warfighter capa-
bility. The project manager is responsible for cost, sched-
ule, and performance (commonly referred to as the “triple 
constraint”) of assigned projects—usually combat systems 
within the Defense Department. The Executive branch of 
government provides the project manager a formal chain of 
command in the DoD. The project manager typically reports 
directly to a program executive officer, who reports to the 
Service Acquisition Executive (an Assistant Secretary for that 
Service—either Army, Navy, or Air Force), who reports to 
the Defense Acquisition Executive (the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Depend-
ing on the program’s visibility, importance, and/or funding 
levels, the program decision-making authority is assigned to 
the appropriate level of the chain of command.
Programs within Defense Acquisition require resources 
(for funding) and contracts (for execution of work) with 
industry. Congress provides the resources for the Defense 
programs through the annual enactment of the Defense 
Authorization and Appropriation Acts, which become law and 
statutory requirements. The project manager, through war-
ranted contracting officers governed by the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulations, enters contracts with private companies 
within the Defense industry. Other important stakeholders 
include actual warfighters, the American public, the media, 
and functional experts (like engineers, testers, logisticians, 
cost estimators, etc.), as well as fiscal and regulatory lawyers.
As a backdrop to this complicated organizational structure 
for Defense project managers, there are three decision-making 
support templates: one for the generation of requirements, a 
second for the management of program milestones, and a third 
for the allocation of resources. Each of these decision support 
systems is fundamentally driven by different and often contra-
dictory factors. The requirement generation system is driven 
primarily by a combination of capability needs and an adaptive, 
evolving threat. The resource allocation system is calendar-
driven by Congress writing an appropriation bill—providing 
control of funding to the Congress and transparency to the 
American public and media for taxpayer money. The Defense 
Acquisition Management System is event driven by milestones 
based on commercial industry best practices of knowledge 
points and off-ramps supported by the design, development, 
and testing of the systems as technology matures. Often inte-


























Figure 6: Defense Acquisition Institution.
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Appendix 2: Helmet Testing Basics
The Army rigorously tests combat helmets worn by soldiers 
against protocols to ensure they conform to stringent require-
ments to protect soldiers against both blunt trauma and 
ballistic threats. Typical battlefield ballistic threats include 
fragments from explosive devices, and bullets from hand-
guns and rifles. Within the Department of Defense, System 
Threat Assessment Reports document relevant and existing 
helmet threats and these threats are validated by the National 
Ground Intelligence Center. With respect to fragmentation, 
the Army Research Laboratory proved that five fragment 
simulators represent 95% of the range of threat fragments 
soldiers expect to face from exploding munitions. Fragment 
threats used in testing include the 2, 4, 16, and 64 grain right 
circular cylinders, as well as 17 grain fragment simulating pro-
jectile. Handgun threats include the 9-mm full metal jacket 
124 grain, 0.357 Sig full metal jacket 125 grain, and the 44 Mag 
240 grain. These threats are defined by the National Institute 
of Justice (NIJ). Rifle threats include eight different rounds 
to include 5.45-mm, 5.56-mm, and 7.62-mm rounds (both 
armor piercing and non-armor piercing varieties).
Helmet testing is a form of destructive testing because 
the helmets are non-recoverable after the testing. Gener-
ally, testing can focus on physical properties (like density or 
melting point), mechanical properties (like tensile strength 
or impact strength), and ballistic properties. Three ballistic 
properties particularly important for helmets are complete 




























Figure 7: Ballistic helmet testing—Penetration.
partial penetration (the bullet does not go completely through 
the helmet), and backface transient deformation (a mea-
sure for the amount the round’s impact indents the helmet 
material).
Depending on the materials selected and the manufactur-
ing process, each helmet will demonstrate a ballistic testing 
curve, represented in Figure 7. The frequency of complete 
penetration can be plotted against the striking velocity of the 
round. A striking velocity of V0 is the highest velocity at which 
no rounds completely penetrate the helmet shell. A striking 
velocity of V100 is the velocity at which all rounds completely 
penetrate the helmet shell. The V50 striking velocity repre-
sents the velocity at which 50% of the rounds completely 
penetrate and 50% partially penetrate the helmet. Figure 7 
labels the zones of variation and non-variation. The variation 
zone represents a performance area for the helmet in which 
the helmet may provide the different levels of protection but 
demonstrate the same V0 and V100 characteristics.
V0 is the “protection parameter” because it identifies the 
warfighter’s guaranteed protection level. It is an important 
parameter in production quality and control; however, it 
does not completely measure material performance and 
depends greatly on the production process. Generally, helmet 
manufacturers want to make the actual V0 demonstrated by a 
helmet higher than the V0 required to ensure a helmet passes 
testing (see Figure 8). V50 is the “material parameter” because 
it does not represent a guaranteed level of protection but is 
important in the optimization of the helmet design. There is 
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Figure 8: Penetration testing conclusion.
Ballistic Testing – BackFace Deformation
Helmet surface after testing
Original helmet surface
Clay surface after testing
Original clay test surface
Backface Deformation Measurement
Figure 9: Ballistic testing—Backface deformation.
a unique V50 for each helmet design. Generally, the design 
goal is to make V50 as high as possible and as close to V100 as 
possible.
During ballistic testing, if a bullet only partially pen-
etrates the helmet, testers measure the backface deformation 
using calipers or laser techniques. The lower the deformation 
exhibited by a helmet in testing, the lower the potential for inju-
ries to the wearer’s head. Figure 9 is a pictorial representation 
of a sample backface deformation measurement. After a series 
of tests, testers plot the observed backface deformations for a 
helmet. This results in a distribution of values around an aver-
age value (Figure 10). The lower the average measured backface 
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Data Distribution









To Increase Testing Success, 
Keep Deformations this way 
(less is better)
Deformaon Tesng – Conclusion
25.4 mm (front/rear helmet requirement)
or
16.0 mm (crown/side helmet requirement)
Backface 
Deformation
Figure 10: Deformation testing—Conclusion.
deformation compared to the required value, the more protec-
tion the helmets offers and the greater the testing success rate 
for the design and manufacturer (see Figure 10).
There is an additional important point to understand 
about helmet testing with respect to battlefield operational 
relevance. In testing, the Army performs V0 resistance to 
penetration and backface deformation testing with the threat 
rounds fired at the helmet at speeds representing threat 
weapon muzzle velocity and at angles of 0% obliquity. This 
represents a worst-case condition that is representative of 
extremely close combat scenarios. Under these conditions, 
the round strikes the helmet with the maximum force and 
the highest chance for penetration, but during combat, the 
enemy fires at various distances from their targets. Over these 
distances, bullets slow down and strike their intended targets 
at various angles. Therefore, in combat, bullets strike soldier 
helmets at speeds significantly lower than muzzle velocity 
speeds and from non-perpendicular angles.
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